This article examines the design of evaluations in settings where there is a choice as to how an intervention is to be introduced and evaluated. It uses data from a rehabilitation programme for offenders on probation in the UK (Bruce and Hollin In press) that had been indicated by a pilot evaluation in one probation area to merit wider-scale implementation and evaluation. For the remaining two probation areas in the region, a randomized controlled allocation of participants to conditions was recommended. One of the areas adopted a stepped-wedge design, in which probation offices were randomly allocated sequentially to the programme. The second area opted to launch the programme across the whole area simultaneously, with a retrospective sample as control group. The paper compares the results of implementation in each probation area and seeks to draw wider inferences about the management of programme implementation and the randomized controlled designs appropriate for similar field studies.
Introduction
It is recognised as good practice when planning the implementation of an intervention or programme to give consideration at the beginning of the process to the method of evaluation to be used. Frequently constraints may be imposed on the evaluation by the type of programme to be implemented, the environment in which it is to be implemented, the types of participant taking part in the study, and the planned outcome measures. Of prime concern in any organisation are the practicalities of applying the evaluation methodology, the additional costs, and the ethical issues associated with the methodology. In some cases, where belief in the implicit value of a programme is strong, the prime concern of an organisation may be to implement the programme as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible, with less importance being placed on the evaluation. These considerations have been frequently raised and have proved to be a barrier to using experiments in the field of criminal justice in the United Kingdom (UK). In an academic forum, the problem was highlighted by Farrington (2003a) who noted that, since the objections raised by Clarke and Cornish (1972) , the implementation of experimental designs in the UK has generally been viewed as impractical in criminal justice settings and therefore not feasible to implement. Challenges to experimental designs have also been levelled on grounds that the controlled conditions impair the context and therefore the external validity of an evaluation (e.g. Pawson and Tilley 1998). What is not always recognised is that the method of evaluation may impose a structure on the implementation which might actually be beneficial and improve the effectiveness of the programme. The purpose of this paper is to describe the adoption of such a structured implementation process and to compare the impact of two different designs in the evaluation of the same programme as implemented in two different geographical areas.
Applying research designs to practice
There seems little doubt that the choice of research design selected for an evaluation can have an impact on the results obtained from the evaluation. A review of 3 current study, Farrington (2003a; McDougall, Perry, and Farrington 2006) A review of the findings from the British RCTs by Farrington (2003a) showed how experimental research can challenge certainty amongst practitioners and policymakers about intervention effectiveness by unsettling preconceptions formed on the basis of weaker research. For example after random allocation to one of three conditions Williams (1975) found, contrary to predictions, that the most disturbed subjects did better than the least disturbed in the 'traditional' treatment. Similarly Cornish and Clarke (1975) were surprised to obtain a null finding from their RCT that compared reconviction rates in young offenders exposed to a therapeutic community with those in cases exposed to a traditional institutional regime. Since RCTs equalise as far as possible the chance of systematic differences between groups, both on measured and on unmeasured variables, this offers the best possible opportunity for isolating the effects of the intervention on the key outcome(s). The importance of this may not be understood by most practitioner staff; Farrington (2003b) attributed practitioner opposition to RCTs to the limited extent to which practitioners in criminal justice are trained in research standards. Instead the randomisation procedure is seen as interfering with practitioner decision-making.
The practical implications of this as well as ethical concerns about withholding treatment in the absence of an alternative are the chief concerns identified in RCT feasibility reviews (e.g. Campbell 2003; Farrington and Jolliffe, 2002) .
On account of the difficulties in implementing a traditional RCT, more common practice has involved analysis of groups 'naturally occurring' in the field setting and have addressed variations between the groups by using matched samples or statistical adjustment. Since in such incidental designs the assignment of cases is not random, groups are systematically different. The effect of this upon the results of outcome evaluations was apparent across the three large-scale evaluations of UK prison-based offending behaviour programmes Falshaw et al. 2004; Cann et al. 2003) . Friendship et al. (2003) found a significant reduction in reconviction rates of 11-14 percentage points associated with the programme participants, relative to matched participants in a control group, by comparing offenders in both groups that had been assessed at a 'medium' risk of reoffending.
Although the groups were matched on a number of relevant factors they may have been systematically different on their motivation to address their offending behaviour.
Using a similar methodology the replication studies did not find statistically different reconviction rates in the two groups (Cann et al. 2003; Falshaw, et al. 2004) . Results became statistically significant however, when the non-completer cases were excluded from the programme referrals group (Cann et al. 2003) . The problem with this is that it violates an intention to treat principle and potentially introduces greater selection bias. The importance of systematic factors related to motivation to change, such as programme completion status, on between groups differences illustrates a key limitation of the quasi-experimental design.
A US study by van Voorhis et al. (2004) amplifies this in undertaking an experimental design and a quasi-experimental design on the same data. In the experimental condition parolees had a 60% rate of programme completion. When experimental and control groups were compared on a number of outcome measures, no significant effect was discerned. However when the design was altered to compare three groups (completers, non-completers and controls) a significant programme effect was then found when controlling for variation in risk factors. This points up the importance of randomisation by illustrating the powerful effect of differences on unmeasured variables, such as motivation to change.
Implementation failure due to organisational factors may have been equally responsible for outcome differences within the programme condition in the above quasi-experimental studies rather than simply due to selection bias because of nonrandom allocation. This was impossible to discount since the research design was not able to establish what would have happened to the non-completers in the absence of the programme. This was the conclusion of the UK Ministry of Justice's own researchers (Debidin and Lovbakke 2005) . Debidin and Lovbakke (2005) cited qualitative research (Clarke, Simmonds, and Wydall 2004) 
Overcoming barriers to implementation in experimental designs
As alluded to above, practitioners and managers in the criminal justice agencies represent the key barriers to the use of experimental designs in routine practice.
McDougall, reviewed problems previously associated with RCTs and sought to address them within their experimental design. They reported that these generally fall into three categories: ethical, practical and statistical. Ethical concerns surround the presumed negative effect on an individual by withholding (or giving) treatment intervention on the basis of random allocation. This view favours quasi-experimental designs since they do not involve randomisation. McDougall, had the advantage that all individuals eventually received the intervention. The disadvantage of this was that outcomes for comparison were limited by the waiting time of the controls and that long-term follow up was not possible as part of the RCT since all of the groups would be treated. In the absence of evidence that the programme works, a valid but less popular ethical view is that treatment and nontreatment groups should be equally and randomly distributed. This is especially at issue in offender groups where there may be inherent risks that the programme may have a negative impact on outcomes (e.g. Sherman et al., 1997) . Practical issues reviewed by concern the occasional operational need to prioritise certain offenders for intervention due to factors such as an imminent release from custody. This was addressed by allowing such practice to continue but allocating the case to a 'cohort' group to be analysed separately.
Statistical issues concern the sample size required to detect an effect of the intervention. Farrington and Jolliffe (2002) identified that the required size of the control group decreases dramatically as the size of the intervention group increased. where the allocated offenders are not deemed suitable for immediate intervention (Farrington and Jolliffe 2002) , can represent a fatal barrier to the feasibility of an experimental design due to its potential to diminish statistical power.
Implementing a novel probation supervision programme
The current study examines the implementation of a supervision programme in each of three probation areas in North-East England (one of which had already implemented the programme). Programme implementation involved training of probation officers and support staff, delivery of the programme with offenders, and instituting the monitoring arrangements to ensure programme integrity. The strategy for implementation and evaluation selected in each area was different, owing to specific local constraints. Area A was the probation area in which the programme had been developed. A pilot evaluation was conducted before the programme was fully implemented, and, based on these results, the programme was then launched area-wide prior to the commissioning of a large-scale evaluation. This meant that Area A was unable to opt for a randomized experimental design, as all offenders were already being offered the intervention. The position in the other two probation areas was different however; they were yet to take on the programme and this offered the opportunity of a choice as to the optimum fit between research design and implementation strategy.
Both remaining areas (Area B and Area C), initially had the same reservations as previously encountered regarding the professional ethics of withholding an intervention from an offender for the sake of a research study. The programme was designed to be delivered as part of a court imposed 'supervision' requirement and provided a framework to intervene with offenders on those 'need' areas that were seen as responsible for the offending behaviour. Denying this facility to some offenders but not others was seen as unjust by a number of practitioner staff. A very reasonable point was also made as to how random allocation of the programme would be managed in the courts process.
In addition to the ethical reservations we encountered, a number of objections to randomisation were raised on the basis of operational management. Random assignment would mean that offender managers (those supervising offenders) would be required to deliver supervision in different ways to different offenders depending on their assignment to the intervention or to the control group. This would present logisitical difficulties in terms of managing cross-over in practice between cases assigned to different groups. In addition to being a threat to construct validity, fidelity of delivery -ensuring that the intervention offered is the intervention received -is seen as a key mediator of successful interventions (Andrews et al., 1990) . This is an issue for programme integrity managers tasked with ensuring that cases receive the intended treatment (Hollin 1995) . Monitoring by managers is made easier if the manager is clear that one system prevails in the office. The operation of different systems simultaneously also presents a dilemma for staff training: would practitioners be expected to employ new skills and awareness with some offenders and not with others, or alternatively should the randomization be at the practitioner level so that all individual practitioners would be following a single system? This would then require a degree of non-random assignment since, when allocating work, managers often need to match offenders to staff according to diversity (e.g. gender) or geographical factors (e.g. offender home location).
Solutions adopted
The difficulties discussed above persuaded us that it was not going to be manageable to randomize individual offenders within a single probation team. We concluded that the choice for the two areas was between a pre/post quasiexperimental design involving a single area-wide launch, and an experimental design which randomized to clusters of offenders at the level of probation office (a 'stepped wedge' design, described in the method section below). This meant that the experimental design would require a series of staggered launches, whereas the pre/post design would require no more than one large launch process.
The option of a pre/post design carried a number of practical advantages in terms of consistency in training with a brief/intensive training schedule, consistency in monitoring and consistency in delivery. It was possible that a single launch would have greater impact than a staggered launch and might therefore be better in terms of senior leadership and momentum. For this reason the pre/post design was affectionately referred to as the "big bang" approach.
From an evaluation perspective, however, such an approach would not allow proper control for temporal changes and consequently any differences before and after the programme introduction could be confounded.
The staggered approach conversely would require a series of smaller training events and the concept of gradual expansion. This might be advantageous in terms of learning from experience within the area. It would also mean that the units for integrity monitoring of programme delivery were smaller. This was important to prevent contamination between units -a risk inherent to the staggered implementation approach. All cases assigned to the intervention group would initially be analysed within that group ('intention to treat' analysis). Given that programme implementation in the community is not expected to be 100%, Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) analysis might then be required (Hewitt, Torgerson, and Miles 2006) . This uses the randomisation as an instrumental variable to assess the impact of the intervention among those who received it.
These different advantages meant that from a programme management perspective one was unsure as to which approach would be more successful. We were however unequivocally clear about our preferred approach from a research perspective, and recommended the staggered implementation approach as this would allow us to control for temporal changes that the previous approach would not.
The senior management teams of the two probation areas were working within different sets of operational challenges at the time a decision was required. Area B's internal monitoring had uncovered disparities between offices in performance. Area C meanwhile was confronting various issues relating to resourcing and staff workloads. There was a perception by Area C that a single launch event ("big bang") would be easier and less costly to launch than a series of smaller events. Area B was however more persuaded by the benefits of a phased roll-out so that the offices that were least affected by performance difficulties would not be influenced by the other units. Hence Area B opted to randomize while Area C did not.
Ahead of programme implementation, three main questions emerged. First, which approach would prove to be more successful? Success here would be defined by the extent to which supervising offender managers used the programme with 
Method

Description of the programme implemented
The Citizenship programme (Citizenship) is based on the assessment of crimerelated need driving structured cognitive-behavioural intervention with individual offenders. Citizenship was designed in Area A by a working group of practitioners under the supervision of an academic consultant (Bruce and Hollin In press). The resulting programme was designed to be consistent with the principles of effective practice and accessible to a wider range of offenders than are 'accredited'
programmes. As such Citizenship is targeted at all medium and high risk offenders and the programme is able to respond to a wide range of crime-related needs. The modular nature of the programme and its links to supporting external agencies, is illustrated in Figure 1 . A requirement of supervision in the community is generally only court-ordered in cases where the risk of reconviction is deemed 'medium' or higher ('Tier' 2-4). Area
A and Area C both chose to provide Citizenship supervision to all supervision cases.
Area B, however, opted to target Citizenship only at higher risk offenders ('Tier' 3-4).
This meant that the target group in Area B was a sub-set of that in the other two probation areas.
Design/Procedure -Area A Area A was the operational area in which the programme was developed. The programme was implemented area-wide prior to the large-scale evaluation. The fact that programme delivery staff had all already been trained in the programme meant that it was not possible to conduct a randomisation of the intervention (due to possible contamination). The method selected in Area A was therefore a quasiexperimental design in which the effect of the intervention was examined against outcomes in cases that had received traditional treatment prior to implementation Design/Procedure -Area B Area B opted for the staggered launch, i.e., a randomized 'stepped wedge' research design. In a stepped wedge design an intervention is rolled-out in sequence to the participants, either as individuals or as clusters of individuals (see Brown and Lilford 2006) . This happens over a number of time periods. The order in which the intervention is rolled-out to the different individuals or clusters is determined at random. By the end of the randomization all units will have been allocated to receive the intervention at some point in the study period. Due to the difficulties described above in terms of possible contamination between intervention and control participants where the experimental intervention is delivered at the same site as the control intervention, Area B opted to randomize to participants in clusters. Each probation office was a cluster in the stepped wedge.
In a stepped wedge design, data is collected from all clusters before and after the point where a new cluster receives the intervention. For operational reasons Area B required that offices were paired so that wherever they occurred in the randomisation they were accompanied by their pair office.
Therefore randomisation to each step in the wedge was completed with a coin toss performed 3 times to allocate the 6 steps in the stepped wedge. This was performed in a management group meeting consisting of the evaluation team and the key stakeholders to avoid any issue of allocation compromise. Table 1 shows the time periods for implementation in each probation office in Area B.
There was a minimum of a 2 month interlude between launches in each office, to allow time for new cases in the intervention step(s) to undergo Citizenship. However, all offices were scheduled to receive Citizenship meaning that some offenders would receive the programme after an interlude. The drawback to this is that because all cases should receive the programme by the end of the roll-out, it is not possible to compare outcomes with a comparison group once step 6 has started nor is it possible to examine the longer-term effects of the programme on offenders.
Our sample size was constrained by the number of offices in Area B. Ideally, we would have preferred to have a greater number of offices to randomize. However, we felt that using a stepped wedge approach maximised our statistical power for the number of offices available. Implementation data were collected as part of the evaluation and collated by the evaluation team (not staff employed by Area B).
Design/Procedure -Area C Area C selected the "big bang", or single area-wide launch process, as this was seen to be more efficient than a series of incremental launches. This necessarily implied the need for a retrospective comparison sample, and a quasi-experimental design.
All cases receiving supervision in Area C during the implementation period 
Results
Results of programme implementation in each Area are presented below under three headings: i) take-up rates; ii) implementation costs; and iii) relationship between key factors and the methodology selected.
Take-up rates
The overall use of the programme post-implementation in all three areas of the region is shown in Table 2 below. Area A, the area responsible for designing Citizenship, used a "big bang" or blanket launch as their strategy for implementation. Area B was the probation area that chose to implement the programme to offices in sequence according to a random assignment in which offices were randomly allocated to steps in the 'stepped wedge' (see Figure 2) . Table 2 gives the overall results of implementation in terms of the use of the programme by officers postenrolment into the experimental section of the wedge. In Area B the programme was targeted at offenders of 'tier' 3 and 4. Such offenders are a sub-set of those targeted by Areas A and C, but they represent the more troublesome group as by definition they have a higher level of crime-related need than lower tier offenders. Table 2 shows that the programme was used by practitioners in approximately 44% of these cases.
The extent to which this take-up varied by 'step' (office) is shown in Table 3 . Area B conducted file inspections of a sample of cases in each office at the end of the introduction of each office into the experimental part of the stepped wedge. These spot-checks found higher rates of take-up, ranging from 63% to 79%. Indeed in many offices there was evidence of under-use of the contact codes for recording evidence of the programme session, suggesting that the figures are if anything an under-representation of the true rate of programme implementation. This may also have been true for the take-up rates shown for the other areas. Table 3 about here Area C was the second area with a choice as to how to implement to meet the needs of both practice and evaluation. Area C chose to implement at once, that is in a similar approach to that used by Area A, with a single "big bang" inauguration process (see Figure 3 ). Here the programme was targeted at offenders at tiers 2, 3, and 4, again as in Area A. The programme was implemented with just over onequarter of these offenders (27.6%). Area C's internal monitoring led the area to believe that some teams were not engaging fully with the programme. Issues were identified relating to workload / resourcing, as well as related issues in understanding how and with whom the programme should be applied. The Area therefore took the decision to re-launch the programme -a second "big bang".
Implementation costs
One cost consideration is the frequency of training events. A total of eighteen training events were run in Area A to ensure that new staff as well as those that may have missed earlier training, were all fully equipped to run the programme with their cases. In Area A training events were scheduled to take place when enough new participants had gathered to warrant a new session. This method was therefore responsive but not timely for all participants.
Unlike Area A, only nine training events were required by Area B. These doubled as mini-launch events and allowed further opportunities for those offender managers that were required to use the programme but had missed the training for their own office. In order that individual offices could learn directly from the designing area, a practitioner was selected from each office to be trained as a trainer by Area A practitioners. Training delivery was always by practitioners from the office to be trained. This was therefore a model whereby each office had a trained 'champion'.
Area B found this to be an efficient model for the transfer of learning from Area A in how to deliver the intervention. In terms of programme training this therefore seemed to be a convenient model that kept costs to a minimum. Area B also undertook monitoring, including a 'dip-sample' inspection two months after each office had been trained in the programme. A larger scale audit was also done following the area-wide roll-out of the programme.
Area C trained all of their staff also in nine training events all between February and March 2007. This is the same number of training events as required by Area B. This intensive process followed Area C's desire for efficiency in programme implementation (attempting to train all staff in a short period of time). All staff were reported as having attended the sessions provided. This of course carries opportunity costs as well as capital costs due to the inevitable impact of withholding such a large proportion of operational staff during the training period. Since then Area C have conducted internal monitoring on a monthly basis, focussing on the extent to which the programme was delivered by the various teams, and also on the integrity of delivery of the various components of the programme. This led to an area-wide relaunch in April 2008, mid-way through the evaluation window, with consequences for costs as well as for the evaluation. The relaunch involved raising the programme on teams' agenda's through meetings as well as a coordinated leafleting campaign.
Relationship between key factors and selected methodology
Area A's results can be more attributed to commitment to programme implementation at senior management level, including a number of file inspections, rather than the implementation method adopted. An area-wide launch process was also used in Area C as they saw this as the most efficient implementation design. An attractive feature of this approach for their senior management was the fact that, in theory, there was only need to attend a minimum number of briefing sessions and this therefore represented least cost. Also from a leadership perspective dilution of messages about the importance of the programme is kept to a minimum. Neither of these assumptions is necessarily correct since there are inevitably a number of staff that are unable to attend the first launch events, meaning that there may be need for 'after-shocks' or further launches to ensure all practitioners are on-board. This appeared to be the case in Area C where an entire re-launch was required due to misunderstandings about the programme. This was also seen previously in Area A as evident from the number of training events that were scheduled.
A planned sequence of training events was a key benefit for Area B and avoided them having to attempt to train all staff at one time. The use of a phased method of staff training is not restricted to the stepped wedge implementation design.
Staggered implementation was however one of the key features of the methodology selected by Area B and required the area to take this approach to training. This facilitated programme championing at site level, in a way not naturally facilitated by a "big bang" approach to training.
Area B was also able to implement a schedule of monitoring to correspond to the staggered roll-out of the programme. This allowed the performance in different delivery units to be compared. This can be seen as an advantage specifically associated with the selected methodology. It also allows corrections, where necessary, to be made to practice during the relevant step in the wedge thereby enhancing delivery and evaluation.
Discussion
The implementation of offending behaviour programmes in the community is known to be problematic and to affect the results of effectiveness evaluations (Andrews et al. 1990; Dowden and Andrews, 2004; Lipsey 1999b) . At the same time there is concern that weaker evaluation designs, for example those not using a randomized experimental approach to the assignment of cases, may produce different results or find inflated effects compared to randomized experimental designs (e.g. One of the main concerns of Area B related to maintaining its standards on a number of measures used by the UK Ministry of Justice to manage national performance.
Area B was aware of performance differences between its offices and was therefore persuaded by the suggestion of a randomized 'stepped wedge' experimental design.
This was thought to be of benefit on two fronts. First, it meant that the organisation, across the board, would not be impaired by a widescale implementation regime at the same time that it was attempting to maintain its performance. A phased introduction would be somewhat easier to absorb. Second, Area B had listened to and accepted the arguments in favour of a randomized experimental approach in terms of better quality of the eventual evaluation evidence. This highlights the importance of close working between staff with research skills and those operational staff whose focus is on day-to-day practice.
The same information provided to Area B to help them make a decision was also given to Area C. Against best recommendations however Area C decided upon blanket implementation. This decision was taken in the interests of resources and workloads; area-wide implementation was seen to be easier and less costly than the staggered approach that was suggested as an alternative. The current paper therefore sought to answer whether the implementation approaches selected produced the expected results for the organisations. Did Area B find that a phased approach to implementation was successful in expanding the use of the programme across different offices? And did Area C indeed find that a "big bang" approach to implementation was effective in terms of take-up in practice across its geographical area? Was this as thought by Area C, easier and less costly than staggering programme implementation?
The results provided a salutory lesson to operational managers and policy-makers responsible for the implementation of a new programme where the outcomes are untested or in need of replication. While Area B targeted their intervention at more troublesome cases, their use of a stepped implementation design produced take-up rates better than those seen in Area C where the cases targeted also included offenders considered lower risk and easier-to-reach. Area B achieved rates of approximately 44% while Area C only implemented with approximately 28% of cases.
As a result of regular internal monitoring Area C took the decision to re-launch the implementation of their programme. This undermined the idea that a single "big bang" or blanket implementation effort can carry sufficient momentum to reach all operational staff. This was clearly not the case as staff were unsure about how the programme should be applied. Area C's performance and information team should be commended for detecting the problem through their regime of regular internal monitoring.
Workloads and resources were important considerations to both areas. In a previous period Area A, where the programme was developed, undertook a number of thorough and costly internal inspections to follow up the many training events that had been held to ensure that all staff were fully equipped to run the programme. The good implementation results for Area A (75% uptake) reflect the level of investment made, as well as the fact that the take-up rates reflect a longer amount of time elapsed to allow them to routinize delivery of the programme. Area B however achieved reasonable take-up rates with the harder-to-reach offenders on the back of just 9 small scale training sessions and a similar number of inspections over the course of a year. One of the biggest advantages seen by Area B that was absent in Area C during the first year of implementation, was product championing at office level to enable the programme to embed properly. This was made necessary by the type of implementation design adopted. The stepped wedge design meant that Area B was obliged to train each office independently to avoid contamination between experimental and control sections of the wedge. This method of gradually mainstreaming practice was seen as highly beneficial by Area B. Growing confidence in Area B was off-set against mounting confusion amongst practitioners in Area C where the implementation strategy was immediate rather than gradual.
Ironically, given that Area C was targeting a greater number of offenders than was Area B, it may have particularly benefited from the use of a staggered implementation strategy.
The results of programme implementation in the two areas have a number of implications. Area B will want to continue to embed the programme within routine practice and will need to continue in monitoring and auditing how the programme is being delivered. Area B will also await the results of the evaluation comparing delivery of the intervention with the old standard practice, within and between randomly selected offices. Area C meanwhile will need to review the success of their re-launch and re-consider the options for evaluation in their area. Since programme implementation is often cited as an indicator of effectiveness (e.g. Andrews et al. 1990 ), it may be better to change the evaluation window in order to compare more distinctly the intervention programme with the old standard practice. There are clearly strengths and weaknesses associated with all three designs. Since the terms of the trade-off between them are likely to vary with the setting, a set of criteria are needed by which choices might be made. From the findings from the experience in North-East England outlined above, the key criteria emerging can be summarised as:
Statistical integrity: the reliability of estimates of effect size, which will in turn depend on completion rates, selection issues, sample size and extent of randomisation.
Evaluation duration, cost and risk of delay: the time likely to elapse from the beginning to the end of the evaluation phase, the risks of delay associated with the various options, and the training, launch and familiarisation costs of each option.
Managerial issues: variation in the degree of managerial commitment across sites, in the degree to which randomisation is feasible with given staffing levels and in the degree to which the experimental outcome might influence further decisions about provision.
The superior performance of option B in the event resulted from the superior statistical properties of the design (relative to design C) and the managerial impracticality of design D. This serves to establish approaches of design type B as well worth exploring. More generally, however, the implication is that the design of such policy experiments and evaluations need take account of managerial concerns and may not turn exclusively on issues of statistical reliability.
The implications of the present paper extend to a variety of other arenas and their field settings. For one it contributes evidence on the feasibility of randomized controlled trials. The benefits to hypothesis testing are often considered by operational managers to be outweighed by the attendant practical and ethical difficulties (see Farrington and Jolliffe 2002) . Not only was the approach taken in Area B seen to be ethical, its practical benefits in terms of mainstreaming a new intervention while causing minimal disruption to general performance impressed Area B and its neighbours. The 'stepped wedge' design may therefore offer a best means of upholding internal validity while implementing a programme in a way that the results can be generalised rather than seen as a relic of the controlled procedure whose conditions are quite unlike those that characterise routine delivery (e.g. Lipsey 1999a).
We look forward to reporting the results of the three individual outcome evaluations, but in the mean-time we hope that when faced with a choice as to the best design for implementation and evaluation, policy makers, operational managers, researchers and practitioners everywhere remember the parable of the two agencies where the one that randomized did so with minimum disruption and were ready to evaluate on time, while the one that did not randomize had to start their implementation again. 
